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“We are one, but we are different”:  
Murle identity and local peacebuilding in 
Jonglei State, South Sudan
 Executive summary
By Diana Felix da Costa
Despite the Murle group being politically and economically marginalised, local and national 
political and popular discourses portray this group as the main aggressor in South Sudan’s 
Jonglei State. This widely asserted narrative ignores the fact that responsibility for the cycle 
of violence in Jonglei rests with all those perpetrating violence and certainly not solely with 
one group. While sharing an overarching ethnic identity, when it comes to issues of peace-
building the Murle can be neither seen nor treated as a consolidated group. Rather, there are 
 cattlekeeping Murle living in the lowlands of Pibor county and agrarian Murle living in the 
Boma  Plateau; there are also age-sets, clans and many other differentiating factors. Accus-
ing all Murle of responsibility for violence only serves to magnify the sense of marginalisation 
and isolation felt by the Murle as a whole. This policy brief seeks to address some of the differ-
ences between the cattlekeeping lowlands Murle and the cultivating highlands Murle from the 
Boma Plateau. By doing so it highlights the importance of understanding cultural specificities 
and the local political economy and, when it comes to peacebuilding, of differentiating who is 
 responsible for a specific conflict and who has influence over those responsible.  
Introduction1
Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
in 2005, which led to the independence of South Sudan in 
July 2011, the main cause of insecurity, instability and 
displacement in the new state has been communal vio-
lence. Jonglei, the largest of South Sudan’s ten states, has 
been hit the hardest by inter-communal and political 
conflicts. 
Local and national political discourses portray the Murle 
group as the main aggressors and the source of much of 
the instability affecting the state.2 Such Murle stereotypes 
are partially driven by concrete experiences, but are also 
largely manipulated to serve political purposes. Govern-
ment control over the Murle community is reasserted and 
legitimised through a perpetrator narrative, which is a 
discourse sustained by prominent senior government 
officials, NGOs, media agencies and the general population 
“despite the reality of a politically and economically 
marginalised Murle” (Laudati, 2011: 21). 
This policy brief seeks to briefly and necessarily superfi-
cially unpack some of the nuances and complexities that 
exist within one specific dimension of Murle identity, i.e. 
the differences between the pastoralist lowlands Murle, 
known as Lotillanya (from the Lotilla river), and the 
agrarian highlands Murle, known as Ngalam (which in the 
Murle language also means someone with no cattle), from 
the Boma Plateau. By doing so the policy brief highlights 
the importance of understanding cultural specificities and 
the local political economy, and – when it comes to peace-
building – of differentiating who is responsible for a specific 
1 The policy brief is based on ongoing fieldwork in the Boma Plateau in Pibor county in Jonglei State, home of the Murle agrarian community, and the findings are most 
reflective of Murle from Boma. The author is grateful to Mike Arensen for useful discussions and feedback on this policy brief. 
2  For example, referring to Murle disarmament, Laudati (2011: 24) quotes President Salva Kiir as saying: “either I leave them with guns and they terrorize the rest of 
the people, or I crush them to liberate the other people from being always attacked by the Murle.” For other examples, see also Arensen (2012: 30-33).
2conflict and who has influence over those who are respon-
sible.  
It is clear that further studies are still necessary to recog-
nise the nuanced emic and etic understanding of what it is 
to be Murle, as well as the differences internally within the 
group. If distinctions such as livelihood, region, red chief 
clan and age-set are recognised by the community inter-
nally, then any responsive peacebuilding initiative should 
also acknowledge these and be very mindful of not gener-
alising or grouping such internally different groups 
 together. Ultimately, responsibility for the cycle of violence 
in Jonglei rests with all those perpetrating violence and 
certainly not solely with one group.
Who are the Murle? 
The Murle are a small tribe of about 148,000 people 
(although the numbers may be higher) who centuries ago 
migrated from Ethiopia to the south-eastern corner of 
Jonglei State. While the majority of the Murle are pastoral-
ists living in the flat open lowlands that spread from the 
Pibor, Veveno, Lotilla and Kengen rivers, Maruwo Hills and 
Labarab, there is also a smaller group of Murle farmers 
living in the Boma Plateau and surrounding areas. 
The Murle share a history and language, and several 
collective symbolic categories such as common names, 
cosmology, legends, clans and system of social organisa-
tion such as the very important clans and age-sets, among 
other elements. Significantly, all of Murle society is 
organised according to age-sets, or generations, where 
men form a group based on age that accompanies them 
through life, although these age-sets are most important 
during youth when young men are searching for wives. In 
addition to “red chiefs” from each age-set, there is also a 
certain internal hierarchy and the “elders” of each particu-
lar generation have often a more prominent role. The 
age-sets originate from Gumuruk in the lowlands and 
arrive later in the Boma Plateau, usually lasting for roughly 
a ten-year span. While rather complex, the current domi-
nant generation in both Pibor and Boma is the Botonya, 
although in the lowlands the Lango are attempting to 
assert themselves, but have yet to reach clear dominance 
against the Botonya. Some interviewees argue that much of 
the current troubles originate from the fact that the 
Botonya – the group that are most involved in violence 
– have not yet been given dominance by the older Titoch, 
and therefore find themselves caught between the Titoch 
and the emerging Lango. In Pibor a younger generation 
called the Tagot is emerging.
The Murle are very mobile and it is common to find Pibor 
Murle living in Boma and vice versa. There are also many 
inter-marriages between pastoral and agrarian Murle, and 
those from Pibor are often referred to as “in-laws” by those 
from Boma, with most people having relatives in both 
places.  
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Murle identity
Although the Pibor and Boma communities continue to 
consider themselves as sharing one overarching ethnic 
identity, the Murle use this ethnic identity instrumentally, 
associating and disassociating themselves according to 
need, and to some extent even as a survival mechanism. 
There are, however, practical differences between the 
Pibor and Boma communities, and the Murle minority from 
Boma often feel they are both marginalised and given a bad 
name by their Pibor “in-laws”.   
Critically, life among the lowland Murle is oriented around 
cows, which determine livelihoods, division of labour, 
marriage, lifestyle patterns and every part of social life, 
while in Boma people live from cultivation and have no 
cattle. “Ngalam” is the Murle term used to describe those 
with no cattle. While the Boma Murle use the term to 
describe themselves as a social group or “tribe”, and 
increasingly refer to themselves as Ngalam as a way to 
disassociate themselves from the violence related to cattle-
raiding perpetrated by the “other” Murle, it possesses 
derogatory connotations when used by a cattlekeeping 
Murle to refer to those of Boma. 
Cattle raiding is intimately related to much of the violence 
happening in Jonglei. Yet, as an agrarian people, the Murle 
from Boma are not directly involved in this kind of violence. 
Cattle raiding and communal violence also intersect closely 
with militia activity, and the ongoing David Yau Yau rebellion 
grew substantially out of Murle resentment against the 
Sudan People Liberation Army’s (SPLA) violent disarma-
ment campaign, which was particularly violent in Pibor. As 
a result, many lowlands youth joined Yau Yau, who 
 relaunched his rebellion against the government in August 
2012. 
As an acephalous society, there is no one individual 
responsible for taking decisions for the whole of Murle 
society. “red chiefs” are those holding spiritual power and 
tend also to play an important role among the age-sets of 
both the lowlands and highlands Murle. There is, however, 
a sense that Murle youth in Boma have greater respect for 
government authority, including local chiefs, than cattle-
camp youth. This may be related to the longstanding 
presence of the SPLA among the Murle of Boma, who have 
therefore become more used to some sort of government 
presence. 
Historically, the lowlands Murle aligned themselves with 
the Arab government through a militia known as the 
”Brigade” led by Ismael Konyi, while the highlands Murle 
from Boma aligned with the SPLA. In fact, Boma was one of 
the first towns captured by the SPLA in 1985, and many 
Murle from the Boma area were recruited into the SPLA. 
While this is no longer a divisive issue between Boma and 
Pibor Murle, there are political tensions between the two 
groups. Boma, which was previously an SPLA stronghold 
and the headquarters for Pibor, was demoted to payam 
status (effectively a cluster of villages) and eventually to 
sub-county, while Pibor was made into the county head-
quarters. 
Perhaps the most compelling and grave example of how 
these differences play out are abductions of Boma children 
by lowlands Murle. Child abduction is practised by the 
latter group, but not by the Murle from Boma. for example, 
during the time of writing in April 2013, a young child was 
abducted in Upper Boma overnight by four armed Murle 
men from Maruwo Hills, one of whom was related to the 
child’s family. The child was not recovered, but one of the 
abductors was caught, revealing the identity of the abduc-
tors. These kinds of incidents were reported by highlands 
Murle as the greatest example of why they “cannot trust 
Murle” from the lowlands and serve to illustrate the 
fragmentation and tension within the Murle. It should, 
however, be added that such criminal acts are also 
 reported to be perpetrated by cattlekeeping Murle from one 
area on cattlekeeping Murle from another area and are 
widely considered to be the work of criminals.
Despite the social tensions described above, the Murle 
from Boma have welcomed their “in-laws” from Pibor and 
Maruwo Hills when these have faced conflict in their areas. 
This may well be a matter of survival, given the sense of 
marginalisation the Murle feel as a whole. In some ways it 
is a utilitarian understanding of identity, which is situation-
al and interactive, i.e. it is constructed relationally and can 
change according to specific interests. The Murle negotiate, 
accept and challenge identities that are projected onto 
them by others. Yet, once a Ngalamit, always a Ngalamit,  
no matter how many cattle a man may possess and even 
though he is living in Pibor, suggesting that identity is also 
fixed. 
Implications for peacebuilding 
Communal violence throughout South Sudan and particu-
larly in Jonglei remains one of the country’s most critical 
issues of national security and stability. While peace 
conferences serve to get groups to talk, these conferences 
have to be linked to tangible measures. Better sharing of 
resources and power, the improvement of service delivery 
such as education and infrastructure such as roads and 
telecommunications (e.g. there are still no phone connec-
tions in Boma), controlling firearms in the hands of 
civilians, and disciplining the armed forces are all critical 
to diluting the sense of marginalisation felt by the Murle as 
a whole, but also by other groups.    
Locally, it is important to recognise the differences that 
exist within and among groups. In the context of the Murle, 
the differences briefly discussed above serve to demon-
strate the extent to which the Murle cannot be perceived 
and engaged in terms of an “imagined” and unified Murle 
community. for example, the small cattlekeeping Jie tribe 
living in Boma sub-county raid and are raided by the 
cattlekeeping Murle. Yet often the Jie take revenge for raids 
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Murle on the agrarian Murle from Boma.  
Key questions need to be asked: who specifically is insti-
gating and driving conflict? Who specifically has the ability 
or influence to reduce it? Since the Murle do not have a 
consolidated leadership who can influence the entire 
group, assembling “Murle politicians” from Juba, “youth 
leaders” from Pibor town or “local chiefs” from Boma is 
not necessarily the appropriate way to respond to localised 
violent events. rather, engagement should target particu-
lar red chiefs, leaders and specific age-sets from the 
specific area where the raiding originates.  
The highlands Murle are trying hard to disassociate 
themselves from the violence in Jonglei and hence from the 
Murle group by rejecting cattle-raiding with the Nuer and 
Dinka and refusing to support the Yau Yau rebellion. Yet by 
being lumped in with those who are effectively perpetrating 
violence, they themselves are being driven towards vio-
lence. Similarly, lowland Murle point to certain regions and 
age-sets as perpetrating violence, rather than the entire 
community. Not all Murle support cattle raids, child 
abductions and violence, just as not all Lou Nuer or Dinka 
Bor support raids, child abductions and violence. 
rather, raids or abductions are very localised affairs. Just 
as the Murle from Boma and Pibor are different, if one goes 
even further, Murle from Pibor also belong to different 
regions, clans and age-sets. Peacebuilding and conflict 
mitigation actors must recognise and identify the nuanced 
differences between those who are responsible for violence 
and those who are not. At a higher level they should 
differentiate between the lowland and highland Murle, but 
also more specifically between the minority of lowland 
Murle behind the raids and the majority who are not. 
Recommendations to the UN Mission in South 
Sudan/donors/international NGOs
• Spend more time: Consider carrying out longer-term 
missions to troubled locations that invest in building 
relations and trust with communities and allow for 
greater understanding of the situation, in place of the 
one-day visits that are often the case.
• Grassroots engagement: Invest in more local staff 
members so that missions can consistently and widely 
communicate with civilians as well as with local 
government. relationships and engagement tend to be 
with government officials, or with the officials who are 
present, while more independent information gathering 
will improve understanding, respect and a perception of 
impartiality among the local population.
• Support to existing livelihoods: Support livelihood 
activities that respect and support existing livelihoods 
and lifestyles, in particular those that take into account 
pastoral, transhumant or agrarian activities.
• Invest in development: In addition to peace confer-
ences, dedicate more resources to supporting tangible 
peace dividends such as the construction of roads, 
telecommunications, schools and health centres.
• Directed programming: Implement programmes that 
fit current livelihoods rather than attempt to change 
them. for example, create a system of mobile schools 
in transhumant areas, which will ensure that youth do 
not have to choose between an education and the most 
desired livelihood of cattlekeeping.
• Greater understanding: Avoid portraying the Murle as 
the source of all the trouble in Jonglei; instead, develop 
greater understanding of the local political economy, 
including identifying those specifically responsible for 
violence and with power over resolving it.
• More research: Conduct further longer-term research 
into group identities.    
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